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NATO: COSTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Executive Summary

The NATO countries are doubly burdened by their current
defense postures.

The first burden is the very heavy

opportunity cost that their citizens bear to deter
the Warsaw Pact threat.

The second burden is the

low threshold for nuclear conflict in western Europe.
These burdens make it imperative that the U.S. and
the other NATO g overnments find lower cost ways to
conduct the defense of Europe with conventional arrtts.

In the long run, it seems clear that mutual, balanced
force reductions are necessary if we are to achieve
these goals.

But in these times of huge budget deficits

short run solutions to the problem must also be pursued.
Otherwise the voices that call for us to pull back
and reduce our commitment to Europe may well carry
the day.
'

In this paper we explore a system of direct sales
of conventional arms as a means of reducing costs.
Such a system may well have the advantage of promoting
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standardization within NATO, of maintaining (and perhaps
increasing) competition in the development of weapons,
of maintaining a defense industrial base in each country,
of strengthening the NATO alliance, and of reducing
costs of conventional ar1cts.

It deserves our serious

thought.

..
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NATO: COSTS AND OPPORTUNITIESl

Threshold and Burden

The NATO countries are doubly burdened by their current
defense postures.

The first burden is the very heavy

opportunity cost that their citizens bear to deter
the Warsaw Pact threat.

The second burden is the
•

low threshold for nuclear conflict in western Europe.

The two burdens are not independent of each other.
The low threshold for nuclear conflict results from
the high opportunity cost of conventional defense.
&

A deterrent posture based mainly on nuclear arms entails
huge costs, but the costs of a non-nuclear posture
are even higher.

The cost differential is so great

that NATO has decided, at least defacto, to live with
a low threshold for nuclear war in the event of aggres•

s1.on.

To change this situation the United States

and other NATO countries must develop and procure
promising ne·w farnil ies of non-nuclear "smart'' weapons,
or "emerging technologies'' weapons. Otherwise NATO

1The author has greatly benefited from reading Kevin
Sontheimer' s unpublished research proposal, '' A Multi
national Defense Cost Control Study." The debt is
gratefully acknowledged.
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will continue to rely mainly on tactical, theater,
and strategic nuclear weapons to deter aggression.
Unless the costs of a non-nuclear defense posture
can be reduced, the low nuclear threshold in the European
theater will be maintained.

The situation in Europe also affects the rest of the
world. By emphasizing nuclear weapons in the defense
of Europe, NATO illustrates the advantages of nuclear
weapons, thus encouraging the proliferation of nuclear
arsenals throughout the world.

The net result is

a lower threshold for nuclear conflict everywhere.
All countries of the world, not just NATO, stand to
benefit from any progress that will make non-nuclear
modes of defense more affordable.

In this paper some of the sources of the high cost
•

of defense with conventional arms are investigated.
Opportunities for reducing those costs are also considered.

Background

Former Secretary of Defense McNamara indicates that
the initial plans for NATO, the February 1952 Lisbon
Force Goals, called for a primarily non-nuclear counter
to the Soviet threat.

But the plans were never implemented
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because of their high cost.

Instead RAND economist

Malcolm Hoag states,
In defending Europe, early NATO planning sought
double protection.
From the onset it was hoped
that the retaliatory threat of the American
Strategic Air Command would deter the Soviets
from attacking.
But army and associated forces
were sought in sufficient numbers to protect
Europe against invasion even if the Soviets
were not deterred.
In NATO jargon, the main
Deterrent was to be supplemented by a sizable
Shield.

·

Furthermore there was to be a division of labor in
the defense of Europe.

European members with their

military traditions and large land arrrties were to
have primary responsibility for supplying troops.
The United States would supply strategic nuclear weapons
and airpower.

Thus the NATO strategy was compatible

with cost savings from radical forces spec.ialization
within the alliance.

Some might argue that these

potential cost savings were never realized, however.

Hoag argues that the development of a Soviet strategic
nuclear force cast doubt on this strategy.

European

members had less confidence in SAC protection when
invoking it would be likely to bring a massive retaliatory
strike at the United States itself.

Fearing that

SAC protection could not be relied upon, they acquired
a retaliatory nuclear capability themselves.

Also,

given the Soviet nuclear capability, they were less
interested in preventing invasion than in preventing
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devastation from the
to the Shield.
as fallows,

thus reducing their commitment

Kissinger described the European members

''Their secret hope, which they never dared

to articulate, was that the defense of Europe would
be conducted as an intercontinental nuclear exchange
over their heads."

Such thinking threatened the very

existence of the alliance.

The development of tactical and theater nuclear weapons
changed the situation again.

With these weapons reliable

local deterence was again available; albeit at the
cost of a much lower threshold for nuclear conflict.
McNamara reports that in 1967 NATO adopted a strategy
of "flexible response."

The idea was to establish

within NATO a conventional arms capability that would
offset the Warsaw Pact forces, and thereby raise the
threshold at which nuclear arrcts would be used.

But

the NATO countries were unwilling to bear the high
costs of a conventional arms deterrent.

The recent buildup, by both sides, of intermediate
range missiles in Europe has surely increased the
probability of a European nuclear exchange. The nuclear
threshold in Europe is no higher today than it was
in 1967; probably it is lower.

On the other hand

as Ger1rtan ambassador to the United States van Well

\
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points out, ''Now, no one doubts that the United States
will respond to aggression in Europe.''

The Burden and Its Distribution

The costs of defending Europe are huge.

A 1976 General

Accounting Office study reported that the United States
commitment to NATO was over $30 billion a year, over
one third of the total US defense outlay for fiscal
year 1975.

Now, after almost ten years of inflation,

the cost in current dollars is easily twice that much.

Ultimately, significant reductions in these costs
can only be achieved by mutual reductions in force.
Likewise, significant reductions in the threshold
for nuclear conflict require mutual reductions in
nuclear forces.

Furthermore, the achievement of these

reductions is the stated goal of the NATO countries.
As van Well states,
Military security presupposes an approximate
balance of military forces in east and west .•.. In
order to attain lasting security, controlled
arms limitations on the basis of such an approximate
military balance is the only long-term answer
to the threat to peace.
Peace with ever fewer
•
•
weapons is our aim.

Unfortunately the process of negotiating balanced
mutual reductions of forces is a slow one. A more

•
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immediate question is, ''Can anything be done about
the high costs of defending Europe in the meantime?''

Jeffery Record reminds us that, "Fredrick the Great
once observed that,

'He who attempts to defend everywhere

defends nothing.''' According to Record, "The time
has come for our allies, especially our NATO allies,
who today collectively possess human and economic
resources that far exceed those of the US,

to assume

their proportional share of the common defense burden. "
Otherwise, the forces of neoisolationism may well
result in a substantial reduction in U.S. presence
in Europe.

Roger Kaplan argues that "Many influential

Europeans are as aghast as we are at the degree to
•

which they have neglected their defenses, and are
resolved to redress the imbalance."

•

In fact, the US is not about to abandon Europe.

Nor

is it likely--under the current state of procurement
affairs--that our European NATO partners will dramatically
increase their commitment to defense.

Olsen and Zeckhauser

explain that smaller members of an alliance are protected
by spillovers from spending by the larger members.
Therefore they tend to spend

smaller proportion of

their income on defense than their allies.

This argument

has been recently tested and con£ irrcted for the NATO

•
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alliance by Dudley and Montmarquette.

As a result

it would be prudent to look elsewhere for cost reduction
schemes.

If the immediate future will bring neither a reduction
in the level of defense required in Europe nor a more
equal distribution of costs among the members of NATO
then our only hope for cost reductions is to find
more efficient means of procuring and employing weapons.
At least three approaches for increasing the efficiency
of forces in Europe have been made.

While the approaches

are not entirely distinct, they are different enough
to merit discussion.

The three approaches are:

burden

sharing, interoperability, and standardization.

Burden sharing is the natural extension of the forces
specialization that has been part of NATO planning
from the beginning.

Under this approach sub-tasks

of an overall effort would be performed by forces
that are least costly to use.

For example Wettern

reports that, ''Brita in is now providing the air defense
•

•

missile batteries guarding USAF airfields 1n various
parts of the United Kingdorn .... And Norway is providing
storage and the security forces needed for the protection
of US and other NATO equipment stockpiled on Norwegian
soil.''

While burden sharing may be a source of increased
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efficiency, its benefits are likely to be limited
by increased command and control costs and by any
failures to adopt the interoperability measures discussed
below.

Interoperability conc e rns the ability o f v ari o us NATO
forces to service, maintain, and o perat e e a c h o thers
equipment.

For example Polk relates that c urrently

"most European-built combat aircraft use JP S , a more
efficient and safer jet fuel."

USAF air c r a ft use

JPS while USN aircraft use JP4.

It s eems c l e ar that

choosing a standard jet fuel wo uld pr od uc e significant
cost savings.

2

Likewise agreeing o n cali be rs o f weap o ns,

loading machines, magazines and similar e q ui pment
•

would seem to be a good way to reduce c o sts.

Along

these lines Polk argues that, "larg e d ividends accrue
from a capability to 'cross service'

essential consumables

between allied armed forces in a crisis.''

However,

as discussed below, there may be limits to this approach.

Standardization is understood as the effort to adopt
standard equipment (and with it, common doctrine and
procedures) among allied forces.
equipment are rather evident.

2

The costs of non-standard

''NATO presently fields

The same can be said for the Navy and the Air Force
within the u. S.
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thirty-one different antitank weapons, while eighteen
more are under development,'' Bartlett reports.

NATO

is replete with examples of large numbers of different
types of equipment designed for the same purpose,
each with its tail of unique spare parts test equipment
and manuals.

It seems clear that there are high costs to the status
quo situation.

But some, like Polk, are concerned

about the costs of pushing standardization too far. Beyond
cross servicing he argues, ''there is little to be
gained, and much to be lost, from standardization.''
Part of the reason for this disagreement has to do
with the fact that several methods for achieving stan"

dardization have been proposed.

It may very well

be that the costs of joint development, coproduction,
licensing, and direct sales agreements are quite different.

Polk argues that a bilateral development program may
increase costs by as much as 30 percent and a trilateral
program by 73 percent.

Vandevanter reports cost estimates

from 15 to 30 percent higher for a coproduction program.
He cites the experience of the F-104G program as evidence
of the inefficiencies of coproduction.

Polk also

argues against licensing as a method of providing
standardization.

He cites the Hawk missile system
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and the Roland air defense system as examples where
systems produced under licensing proved not to have
interchangeable parts because of national differences
in machine tools, tolerances, and materials.

However,

in conclusion Polk states, "When and if one nation
'builds a better mousetrap'

the other armies and air

forces should buy it directly from the sole source
producer."

It is this last method of providing standardization,
direct sales, that has the characteristics which may
result in substantially lower costs of conventional
arms.

For example Hartley lists thLee sources of

cost savings from standardization.
•

(a)
Savings in development resources are expected
if 'duplication and overlap' in R & D work is
reduced or even abolished (ceteris paribus).
(b)
Economies of scale will reduce production
costs.
Compared with a variety of small scale
outputs, the pooling of ord~rs leading to one
large production run will result in scale economies
and lower unit production costs.
At the same
time, larger orders for a given type of weapon
will enable 'fixed' R & D costs to be spread
over a greater output, so further reducing total
unit costs (i.e. R & D and production).
(c)
Gains from trade will arise if standardisation
results in the creation of a free trade area
•
1n weapons.
On this basis, each NATO member would specialise
in those parts of the weapons development process
in which it has a comparative advantage (i.e. what
it does best).
In this way, it would reap the
gains from international specialisation and
mutually advantageous trade and exchange.
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It seems clear that these savings are more likely
under direct sales than under the other standardization
methods.

The first of these sources of cost savings

may be illusory.

Eliminating overlapping R & Dover

time will reduce competition and concentrate design
resources in one location.

The net result may be

the creation of barriers to entering the particular
product line in question and a consequent increase

in unit costs.

The other two sources are explored

in the following analysis.

Comparative Advantage and the Production of Arms

Hartley emphasizes the cost savings for economies
of scale even though he states, "There is even more

convincing empirical support for learning economies
as a source of lower costs."

In fact our own work

has shown support for both scale and learning effects
on costs but the two effects are very difficult to

separate from each other.

3

Because of this, and in

the interests of simplicity, only the effects of learning
are modeled below.

Adding scale effects to the model

would not appreciably change the results, but it would
complicate the exposition.

3 see Womer, Womer and Gulledge, and Gulledge, Womer
and Dorroh for this evidence.
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To illustrate the savings from learning and from trade,
some simple models of production and effectiveness

for two weapons systems, and two allies are developed.
For example the weapons systems are fighter aircraft
and tanks and the countries are the United States
and the German Federal Republic (FGR).

Learning curves are particularly popular ways to describe
costs of producing military hardware.

reference to learning curves is Asher.

The classic

The concept

also travels under the names experience curve and
progress function.

It describes the tendency for

unit costs to fall with increases in the cumulative

number of identical units that have been produced.

Suppose the unit learning curve for aircraft produced
in the US is

(1 )
where cau is the unit cost of the aircraft.

This

is the equation of an 87 percent learning curve with
a first unit cost of 50 (million$).
curve is plotted in Figure 1.

The learning

It illustrates the

characteristic that doubling cumulative output reduces
unit cost to 87 percent of its previous value.

That

is, with equation (1) the cost of the 50th aircraft
is $22.9M while the cost of the 100th aircraft is

,'

f,

1,
'',,,,
'I
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,

,

$19.9M.

,.

Learning curves for aircraft production have

been estimated between 75 and 90 percent in the

us.

I

,'
i

~-

l"' ·
'f

,·
'·

Furthermore, let the learning curve for tank production
in the US be a 93 percent learning curve.

The equation

•

lS

(2)

This too is representative of US experience.

Total costs of producing aircraft and tanks can be
derived from the two unit curves as
•8

Cau = 62.5 Au

and,

•

(3)

•9

ctu = 11.1 T u •

(4)

If aircraft and tanks are produced independently of
each other, then the alternative quantities of aircraft
and tanks that can be produced for a given US total

-

expenditure (C ) is given by
u
•8

·

•9

Cu= 62.5 Au+ 11.1 Tu

( 5)

This production possibility curve differs from the
usual curve used in economics in that it represents
the tradeoffs between the two goods as a concave function
(see Figure 2).

This result is due to the fact that

-,
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learning lowers the unit costs ot each good as specified
by the learning curves (1) and (2).

Suppose the relative effectiveness of a US force of
tanks and aircraft can be approximated by the relation
.5 .5

= A

u

T

(6)

u

One might argue that the complex interactions among

weapons systems in battle is much too complicated
to be modeled with a simple relation like equation

(6); and, in some contexts, such an argument would
be correct.

Our purpose however,

is merely to illustrate

some resource allocation possibilities, and in this
context the level of abstraction involved in equation
(6) seems no greater than in using simple .learning

curves to model production.

The important characteristic of equation (6)

is that

the curves of equal effectiveness implicit in (6)

are more convex than the production possibilities
of (5).

This permits the problem of maximizing US

combat effectiveness subject to the cost constraint,

Maximize E

u
.8

. 9

subject to Cu= 62.5 Au+ 11.l Tu,

to have an interior solution.

(7)

•

That 1s, the model

predicts that the US will choose to produce and employ
both tanks and aircraft.

Otherwise, only one of the
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two weapons would be chosen.

This is true for the

entire range of parameter values for learning curves
like (1) and (2) and effectiveness functions like

(6).

The particular solution to . (7) for an expen-

diture of $5 billion is Au

=

=

108 and T u

384.

This

solution is depicted in Figure 3.

Suppose the unit learning curves for aircraft and
tanks produced in the FGR are

-.3
and
= 75 A
g

(8)

-.15
C

tg

=

20 T

respectively.

(9)

g
Also, l e t

the effectiveness function

for the FGR be the same as for the US

..

( 10)

For the FGR the constrained effectiveness maximization
problem is
Maximize Eg
•7

subject to cg= 107.1 Ag

.85

+ 2 3.5 T g

( 11)

'

The solution to (11) for an expenditure of ~3 billion
is Ag= 50 and Tg = 118 •
. in Figure 4.

This situation is illustrated
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Now consider an alliance of the US and the FGR.
the point of view of the alliance,

From

I have constructed

a way to spend $8 billion to procure 158 aircraft
and 502 tanks.
in Table 1.

This force structure is summarized

The cost of the last unit pr o duced in

each country is also displayed in Tabl e 1.

It c o sts

78% more to produce an additi o nal t ank in the FGR
than in the US; but, an additi o nal aircraft c o sts
only 18% more in the FGR.

Table 1. The Separately Pr od uce d Fo r c e Structur e

Aircraft
Tanks

Relative
Cost
(

us

FGR

To tal

108
(19.6)

50

1 58

( 23• 2 )

384
( 5. 5 )

11 8
( 9. 8 )

3.55

2.37

502

) the cost of the last unit produced

Figures 3 and 4 can be combined into an Edgeworth
box (Figure 5) to illustrate that this allocation
is inefficient.
senses.

In fact,

it is inefficient in two

First the aircraft and tanks can be reallocated

between the US and the FGR to provide a slight increase
in overall effectiveness.

For example if the FGR

exchanges 6 aircraft for 22 US tanks the effectiveness
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of the US force remains unchanged while the effectiveness
•

of the FGR force increases from 76.8 to 78.4, an increase
of 2%.

In this example the cost of producing aircraft

relative to the cost of producing tanks in the two
countries is similar.

An additional aircraft costs

3.55 tanks in the US while an aircraft costs 2.37
tanks in the FGR.

Had these relative costs differed

by more, the benefits of this reallocation would have
been larger.

The second sense in which the force structure in Table
1 is inefficient concerns the allocation of production
between the members of the alliance.

Table 1 clearly

indicates that these arrrts in these quantities are
less expensive to produce in the

us.

"

If the $8 billion

arms budget for the alliance·. _had all been allocated
to tanks and aircraft produced in the US 194 aircraft
and 647 tanks could have been produced.

Likewise

if the money had been spent on FGR production 203
aircraft and 374 tanks could have been produced.
The US produced force can clearly be allocated to
be more effective than the forces that were separately
'

produced; the FGR produced force may be almost as
effective as the original depending on the relation
between US and FGR effectiveness.
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Neither of those options is likely to prove politically attractive however.

They require country A,

for example, to both forgo the production of any defense
goods and to rely exclusively on its ally, country
B,

for arrrtamen ts.

The first requirement will anger

country A's own defense industry and work force.
The second requirement may result in country A becomming
subservient to country B.

Either alone or together

these consequences may be too high a price to pay
for less expensive weapons.

Fortunately another op tion exists .

At quantities

less than 218 aircraft and 3.3 million tanks the US
has an absolute advantage in the production of both
weapons;

but, throughout the entire range of production

the US enjoys a comparative advantage in the production
of tanks.

Suppose that the US specializes in tank

production, devoting its entire $5 billion to their
domestic production. Likewise let the FGR spend its
entire $3 billion on domestic aircraft.

Then the

alliance would have 888 tanks and 117 aircraft.

These results are illustrated in Figure 6.

The curves

in Figure 6 illustrate the quantities of aircraft
and tanks that are available to the alliance by spending
•

$3 billion on FGR produced arms and $5 billion on
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US produced arms.

Point S (where each country specializes

in the production of some weapon system) can be shown
•

to dominate all of these alternatives.

In particular

it dominates point F, the force structure of Table
1.

Similar results can be obtained for a wide range

of effectiveness function and learning curve parameter
values.

While point S cannot dominate point U (where

all arrcts are produced in the US)

it does not suffer

from the same political disadvantages that alternative
U does.

Alternative S has each country spending its

entire budget at home thus exporting no net jobs to
other members of the alliance.

Of course S would

be opposed by the US aircraft industry and, perhaps,
the USAF but there would be political support for
..
Sas well.

Alternative S does require each member of the alliance
to specialize in the production of some arms at the
expense of others, but it does not put one country
at the mercy of another.

Both types of arrcts are necessary

for either country to have an effective force.

So

this arrcts production scheme is likely to promote a
tighter alliance rather than to breed the distrust
that may be associated with alternative U .

..

-
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The allocation of this force structure is investigated
with the aid of the Edgeworth box in Figure 7.

The

production possibility curves and the equal effectiveness
curves in Figure 7 are the same as those in Figure
4.

However, because all of the tank production is

assigned to the US and all the aircraft production
is assigned to the FGR the dimensions of the box are
changed.

Efficient allocations of arms for this production

assignment are displayed on the contract curve, the
line segment AB.

Negotiated allocations between the

members of the alliance at any position on the contract
curve will increase the effectiveness of one member
without decreasing the effectiveness of the other.
For example,

if an intermediate point that allocates

83 aircraft and 630 tanks to the US is chosen, then
US effectiveness

to 228.7.

increases by 12 percent from 203.6

The effectiveness of the FGR also increases

•
from 76.8 to 93.7, a 22 percent increase.

Of course,

instead of taking the increases in effectiveness,
costs could have been reduced by similar amounts without
changing the effectiveness of either force.

Conclusion

In attempting to shed some light on NATO resource
allocation problems three questions need to be addressed.

•
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First, can a system of free trade in weapons within
NATO function in an economic sense?

Second, can such

a system become politically viable?

Third, can the

cost savings or effectiveness gains offset the costs
of disrupting the current system of nationalistic
production? None of these questions can be completely
•

answered at this time, but there is good reason to
believe that favorable responses to all three questions
may be found.

Economists have studied the mechanics of systems of
markets for over two hundred years.

The general conclusion

of these studies is that in many different circumstances
and technical conditions free trade provides a very
"

reasonable way to allocate resources among participants.
The production and distribution of weapons certainly
presents some unique circumstances but the preliminary
analysis of the previous section seems likely to be
compatible with free trade as well.

A related question concerns the long run viability
of a system that encourages national specialization
in the production of ar111s.

Can a country fail to

win an aircraft production contract for several years
and still compete for aircraft work?

Will the resulting
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lack of competition destroy the advantages that special
ization provided?

While it is likely that some nations will no longer
be in the business of producing military aircraft
there is some reason to believe that current production
experience is not necessary to compete in the defense
industry.

For example, Hughes Helicopter recently

won the advanced attack helicopter competition with
its Apache.

The company then proceeded to build an

entire production facility in Mesa, Arizona to assemble
the aircraft with indigenous labor.

That is,

the

company was quite able to compete without either recent
production experience or facilities.

Furthermore,
•

it seems likely that opening the competition to more
countries will have the effect of increasing effective
competition even if the absolute number of firms in
a segment of the defense industry does decrease.

The political question must also be addressed.

If

there are substantial savings to be had, . why has NATO
not already taken advantage of them?
at best, mixed.
have specialized.

•
The answer 1s,

The smaller NATO countries certainly
Furthermore, the systems of offsets

in conjunction with recent foreign military sales
of US weapons may indicate some movement in this direction.
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But far more needs to be done in this area.

Not only

must U.S. firms be permitted to market their systems
to our NATO allies but we must offset their purchases
with our commitments to buy ar:1cts produced in Europe.
It seems clear that national pride and, perhaps, less
than complete trust in our allies still play a role
in defense resource allocation.

One can only hope

that the low threshold for nuclear conflict and the
growing interdependencies of the North Atlantic community
will provide the additional motivation to reduce defense
costs.

Finally one must ask "Are the gains worth the costs
of disruption?

Can substantial net savings be had
4

from specializing in the production of conventional
a rrll s?• ''

The answers to these depend on the numbers.

They depend on the true values of learning curve coef
ficients for the various military equipment producers
across NATO.

I believe that we can no longer afford

not to answer this question.

'

•

•
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FIGURE 1. A LEARNING CURVE
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FIGURE 2. A PRODUCTION POSSIBILITIES CURVE WITH LEARNING
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FIGURE 3. THE S~LUTION Te PR~BLEM 7
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FIGURE 4. THE FGA ALLOCATION, THE S~LUTI~N TD PROBLEM 11.
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FIGURE 5. THE SEPARATELY
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FIGURE 6. ALTERNATIVE OUPUTS OF AIRCRAFT RN □ TANKS FOR FIXED

DOMESTIC BUDGETS
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FIGURE 7. THE F~RCE STRUCTURE PR~OUCED BY SPECIALIZATI~N.
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